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1. The topic*introduction, working hypothesis, and overview
There are no clear indicators and yardsticks that could provide more concrete
guidance or to help measure policy achievements.1
This article2 examines new reforms designed to remedy the much-discussed
‘‘structural failings’’ of the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).3 These failings are
fleet overcapacity, imprecise policy objectives resulting in insufficient guidance for
implementation, decision-making that encourages a short-term focus, a framework
that does not give sufficient responsibility to the industry, and thus poor compliance.4
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The question under scrutiny is whether a reform of the CFP will overcome the
shortcomings identified by the green paper. Has the EU fisheries policy improved,
or is it upholding the status quo? Is this a momentous leap into the next generation of
bylaws or is it a pipe dream?5
The CFP ‘‘improvements’’ is an optimistic path to follow. The 2013 management
regulation (M-reg)6 cannot restitute the structural failings. Comparative studies on
the 20027 and 20138 legislation and 2001 (‘‘Roadmap’’)9 and 200910 green papers
disclose the inability to devote sufficient political capital to obtain the necessary
radical changes.
As discussed in this article, ‘‘transactional costs’’11 or ‘‘the cement of society’’12 are
strong ‘‘contraceptives,’’ serving to maintain the status quo. I subscribe to the position
that the marginal amendments in the 2013 legislation have been unable to prevent
political obstruction or promote enforcement, impairing the very best of intentions.
2. A platform: CFP shortcomings
It looks as if the CFP and its problems will be with us for some time to come.13
This section exposes the downsides of the CFP, its so-called shortcomings. It
scrutinizes the EU’s own evaluation of these shortcomings, as well as positions taken
by social scientists.
2.1. The shortcomings, legal entitlements, and imperfections*an overview
EU consensus indicates that the CFP has not lived up to expectations on a number
of fronts.14 There are several shortcomings or structural failings in the policy,15 a
continuing ‘‘structural overcapacity’’ and a goal of ending the mess (M-reg Article
22.2; annual capacity assessment report). What makes the EU subscribe to the 2013
solution as better equipped to reversing failures than earlier provisions?
The commission identifies the failings of the CFP as follows:
. A deep-rooted problem of fleet overcapacity
. Imprecise policy objectives resulting in lacking guidance for decision/
implementation
. A decision-making system that encourages a short-term focus
. A framework that does not give sufficient responsibility to the industry
. Lack of political will to ensure compliance and poor compliance by the
industry16
Sections 2.22.7 present these failures in due turn.
Ms. Damanaki has called for support from member states (MS) and members of
the EU Parliament.17 The objectives presented in 2013 M-reg Article 1 enshrine her
good intentions.18 Under its common policies, the EU enjoys exclusive jurisdiction
within the bounds of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
Article 3.1(d), ‘‘the conservation of marine biological resources under the CFP,’’
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which ends MS legislative power. MS conservation competencies are limited to
delegated matters. Beyond areas of conservation, the EU and MS share compe-
tencies. Nonregulated areas or loopholes neglected by the EU have left the arena
open for MS jurisprudence. The EU law’s preemptive force (TFEU Article 3.1) has
resulted in a coherent conservation policy.
The 2013 M-reg failed to change core elements of the CFP. The total allowable
catch (TAC) and quota allocations based on relative stability remain cornerstones
of the CFP’s conservation policy. The equal access principle also remains in force.
In addition, seemingly rational behavior on the part of individuals has resulted
in irrational solutions. Moreover, it has reinstated the prolongation of a 10-year
transitional period to end in 2012, which has now been extended for the fourth time
to 2022.
2.2. The ecological viability of the CFP*‘‘imprecise policy objectives’’
None-the less, 10 years after the WSSD [World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
ment], most stocks in European waters (88%) are still considered to be overfished
and 30% of them are estimated to be outside safe biological limits, which means
that they may not be able to replenish. Thus, up to 2010, Europe is still far from
achieving the objectives agreed at the WSSD in 2002. In this perspective, the
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has been considered ineffective in terms of
reducing fishing capacity as well as in rebuilding marine ecosystems.19
This section focuses on how the 2013 CFP addresses the EU’s vague environmental
goals. An ideal option is to apply the ecosystem approach to fisheries management,
a goal stated in the preamble of the M-reg (Paragraph 13): ‘‘An ecosystem-based
approach to fisheries management needs to be implemented, environmental impacts
of fishing activities should be limited and unwanted catches should be avoided
and reduced as far as possible.’’ Allegedly, this project will (2018) introduce a multi-
species approach and develop indicators of good environmental status.20 Perhaps this
will prove to be a lasting solution.
The main problem is a lack of environmental sustainability, due mainly to fleet
overcapacity and excessive fishing pressure, resulting in the overexploitation of a large
number of stocks. A vital component here is the ‘‘unaccounted excess fish mortality
[that] undermines the effectiveness of the TAC system and the credibility of the CFP’s
sustainability goal from the perspective of fishermen.’’21
To provide information on the misbalance between fishing capacity and fishing
opportunities, each MS shall submit a yearly report to the commission (M-reg
Articles 22.2 and 4). EU subsidization is one main reason for this requirement
(see Section 4.2).
Other factors that contribute to a lack of environmental sustainability are discard
rules (2013 M-reg preamble, Paragraphs 26, 27, 32; Article 2.5[a], etc.), noncom-
pliance with the CFP, financial assistance (2013 M-reg preamble, Paragraph 64),
insufficient enforcement (preamble, Paragraphs 5961), relative stability22 (preamble,
Paragraph 35, and Article 16), and top-down management.
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The present system has prolonged the intermediate CFP solutions of the 1970s
and 1980s. During four transitional periods and reviews, political ambitions were
high, but the CFP endeavored to manage fisheries towards its own objective of
sustainable exploitation.23
The allocation system of ‘‘relative stability’’ is still in force. As envisaged in the
M-reg, it remains one of the CFP’s fundamental elements (preamble, Paragraphs
3537, and Article 16).
Goals related to the lengthy debate on discards and bycatch problems seem, at
least formally, to have arrived at a more innovative stage. In reforming the CFP, the
commission has declared that its purpose is to eliminate discards24 and that a ‘‘future
CFP should ensure that discarding no longer takes place’’25 while concurrently solving
the problem of how a commitment to ‘‘maximum sustainable yield (MSY) can
be implemented in mixed fisheries while avoiding discards.’’26 Together, ‘‘measures
should be taken to further eliminate discards in EU fisheries’’ hereunder to construe
a new CFP that could fit into ‘‘management through transferable quotas.’’27
While the EU is committed to eliminating discard practices, the instruments
are chaotic. A balanced use of new models may potentially pave the way out of
this biological mess. I am, however, doubtful since the M-reg downplays conclusive
expressions of the draft provisions (Section 3.3).
Clearly, a ban on discards cannot operate in isolation. The regulation of fisheries
works in concert with other technical means, such as new rules on bycatches.
However, pessimism is strong*also among social scientists: ‘‘The Green Paper vision
of fish stocks being restored to biomasses that can deliver MSYs by 2020*well after
the previously agreed deadline of 2015*is thus highly unlikely.’’28 This position is,
however, disputed: ‘‘the analysis demonstrates that the process is clearly underway,
both from a biological and economic perspective. Therefore the sweeping statement
that all European fish stocks and fisheries are in a dire state is not supported by recent
data.’’29 Moreover, EU official optimism is high regarding further developments:
But there is good news elsewhere [than in the Mediterranean], as in the Northeast
Atlantic area, and that includes the Baltic and North Seas, overfishing has fallen
from 86% (30 stocks overfished out of 35 assessed) in 2009 to 41% (19 out of 46
stocks) in 2014.30
This article cannot pinpoint a single explanation for these latest developments in
stocks. Some analysts seem to subscribe to the idea that the positive trend commenced
with the introduction of multiannual management plans.31 My impression, however,
is that since the Northeast Atlantic includes areas and species beyond EU waters and
responsibilities, these statistics are inaccurate. Looking at the situation in the North
Sea in isolation, the prospects are less positive. Out of 18 stocks, 9 are not fishable at
all. Of the remaining species, all nine were heavily reduced between 1997 and 2009,
with the exception of tusk.32 Moreover, regarding areas where the EU has sole
responsibility, for example the Celtic Sea (the International Council of the Explora-
tion of the Seas [ICES] Subareas VI and VII), landings of deep-water species in
19992011 dropped from 90,000 tonnes to 20,000 tonnes in 2011.33
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2.3. The CFP socioeconomic viability*‘‘a deep-rooted problem of fleet
overcapacity’’
The commission identifies fleet overcapacity as a fundamental CFP problem, leading
to low economic performance, weak enforcement, and overexploited resources.34
The 2013 reform intended to counter these problems. The modernization of rural
societies has been half-hearted:
The key principles of this model were economies of scale and concentration, forces
which have certainly transformed fisheries. The focus of development was upon
intensification, modernisation and specialisation within sectors, but also the
encouragement of labour and capital mobility. It included inducements to farmers
and fishers to leave their industries.35
This requires, however, alternative work. Unfortunately, these efforts have failed,
and political pressure has forced through subsidization schemes to benefit the
community’s fishing industries. The European Fisheries Fund (EFF),36 which had
a budget of t4304 million for the period 20072013, has been an answer to the difficult
unemployment situation in MS.
[T]he aim of axis 4 [Priority alliance for the sustainable development of fisheries
areas] is not just to tackle the short term effects of the CFP and of the economic,
social and environmental impacts of the depletion of fish stocks. Its purpose is to
help fishing communities and areas to create new sustainable sources of income and
quality living. It does this by providing people who most understand both the
problems and the dreams of fishing communities*with the tools for adapting the
solutions to their real needs.37
Despite conservation and economic downsides, EFF has allocated pecuniary
resources for years, a social system that has boosted life into the many fishing villages
and harbors all over the EU. Presumably, this scheme will continue in the CFP
intermediate period until 2022.
Poor economic results are closely related to CFP social problems. While some
vessels, like the purse seiners, do fairly well, with few exceptions38 most EU fleets are
barely profitable and dependent upon public financial support:
France’s largest deep-sea fishing fleet is being artificially propped up by millions in
state subsidies and cash injections from its owners, said a French NGO. Scapeche,
part of the Intermarche group, has accumulated losses of t19 million before tax
since 2002*and this in spite of t10m in state subsidies and t20m in cash injections
from Intermarche, said the environmental association Bloom.39
Another case is the situation of one of the world’s largest fishing companies,
Pescanova of Spain: The regional government of Galicia offered the company a
bailout loan of t55 million.40 The actual situation of the company is likely to be
worse than this number suggests. The debt of Pescanova’s branch companies and
myriad of subsidiaries has piled up and disguised much higher losses.41 State aid is
one of the basic hindrances to reaching the sustainable fisheries of tomorrow: ‘‘The
problem of excess entry and overcapacities is further exacerbated by the payment of
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subsidies to fishermen tending to support their domestic fishing industry as has
been done intensively by both the European Commission and Member States.’’42
The problem of state aid relates to the fundamental problem of lack of environmental
sustainability (Section 2.2), with overcapacity causing overfishing, low stock levels,
poor catches, and low profits. A full account of the negative effects of subsidization is
not part of the scope of this article.43 EU policy, however, has changed lately.
Even though landings are not subsidised in a direct way any longer, direct and
indirect subsidies have been paid on inputs, such as tax exemptions for fuel or for
modernisation of fishery fleets. Such subsidies either induce further market entry,
or at least maintain the fleet capacity at an excessively high level. Since 2005, the
European Union (EU) has focused on more subsidies for vessel decommissioning
combined with strict limitations on new entry of capacities. Despite this policy,
overcapacity and overfishing remain the key problems of the CFP.44
This is the EU position; see the 2003 regulation on fishing effort45 and the principle
of M-reg Article 22.2 that compulsory reporting shall seek to ‘‘identify structural
overcapacity by segment and shall estimate the long-term profitability by segment.’’
MS should prepare ‘‘an action plan for the fleet segments with identified structural
overcapacity’’ (Article 22.4). Thus, the lack of social viability, which affects fishing
villages and the catching sector, is still a major problem that links to environmental and
economic problems. Social scientists conclude as follows:
It is hard to deny that EU fisheries policy has failed communities socially. Social
objectives have either been left to MS to elaborate or handled as an externality of
fisheries policy, to be dealt with through local development and cohesion strategy.46
2.4. Decision-making failure that ‘‘encourages a short-term focus’’
Reforming the European fisheries policy also means changing the decision-making
process and making it more effective. At present, even the most detailed technical
decisions*such as the mesh size fishermen can use for catching sole off the coast of
Dover*are jointly taken at the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers,
the highest political level in the European machinery.*Maria Damanaki47
According to the EU’s perception, decision-making encourages a short-term focus. A
complex, top-down micromanagement system48 generates poor and often ineffective
implementation of fisheries regulations. Lack of means-ends analyses combined
with low law-abidingness also creates difficulties. In addition, the short-term focus
makes the rather broad CFP objectives, especially those of environmental sustain-
ability, difficult to achieve. The heavy burden of detailed prescriptive rules is too
overwhelming to follow. Perhaps this fact will provide the EU with the impetus to
change the system to a ‘‘bottom-up’’ decision-making system.
Overexploitation results from the fact that ‘‘compared to the recommendations
made by ICES, and even to those made by the European Commission, the Council
of fisheries ministers has continuously set TACs much higher, presumably due
to short-term political considerations.’’49 Presumably, ‘‘paper quotas’’ above ICES
P. Ørebech
116
recommendations have compensated for the lack of ‘‘real fish.’’50 Allocating
nonexistent fish has been the path of least resistance.
Looking overseas, the poor record of EU fishing of non-EU stocks within the
framework of international fishing agreements is attributed in part to the ‘‘pay, fish,
and go’’ policy,51 which has resulted in overexploitation (e.g. off West Africa) and
dire consequences for local fishermen and fishing communities.52 Over the last two
to three decades a ‘‘second generation of agreements’’ has been underway.53 However,
it is still not clear how these two generations of agreements will vary, because the
payment condition is still one of the basic sticking points.54 The new name, Fisheries
Partnership Agreement (FPA), has not changed much.55 As part of its payments
to developing countries, EU grants have improved access to the ‘‘inner market.’’
However, opportunities to take advantage of preferential custom duties are poor:
The cost of equipment needed to comply with SPS [WTO Sanitary and
Psytosanitary Agreement] standards and meet product traceability requirements
is particularly burdensome for small-scale ACP [African, Caribbean, and Pacific]
processors and artisanal fishers. Appropriate European aid must be granted as soon
as possible to meet these challenges. Regional integration measures should improve
hygiene and traceability standards so that ACP populations benefit first from
improved supplies delivered by hygiene and traceability improvements.56
2.5. A framework that does not give ‘‘sufficient responsibility to the industry’’
This section examines current quota-setting procedures and whether the EU’s
new legal approach to stakeholder participation is an apt response to the long-term
criticism. This article, however, refrains from analyzing whether a makeover from
micromanagement to bottom-up decision-making is the ultimate salvation.57
The principal EU conservation management tools are TAC and MS fisheries
quotas.58 In order to understand the process behind TAC-setting and its CFP impact,
it is necessary to review its legal basis and the definition of terms used to describe its
functioning.
The EU defines TAC as quantitative limits on landings, usually expressed in tonnes
that are set at the level of stocks or group of stocks.59 These are defined by the M-reg as
a living aquatic resource that occurs in a given management area.60 The regulation
entitles affected states to make joint recommendations to the commission, which
subsequently may limit fishing activities by limiting catches.61 MS are entitled
to determine quotas on a nondiscriminatory basis ‘‘in their 12 nautical mile zone.’’62
The regulation does not use the term TAC but the substitute term limiting catches,
which is defined as ‘‘catch limits,’’ meaning ‘‘a quantitative limit on landings of a stock
or group of stocks over a given period.’’63 Marine resources have suffered tremen-
dously from the fact that catch limits are based on quantitative limits on landings rather
than catches.64 This is still the same today (2015): ‘‘Landing obligation . . . All catches
of species which are subject to catch limits . . .’’65
Article 4 (21) defines fishing effort as ‘‘the product of the capacity and the activity of
a fishing vessel; for a group of fishing vessels it is the sum of the fishing effort of all
vessels in the group.’’ Thus, fishing opportunity is expressed either in terms of
catches or fishing effort or collectively, and it indicates a quantified legal entitlement
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to fish but is not a guarantee of a certain catch of fish.66 These principles comprise
the framework for the council’s decisions on the TAC after the commission’s
proposal.67
There are four stages in the quota-setting procedure: The first involves scientific
advice from ICES to the commission.68 The second stage includes a provision of advice
from the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) to the
commission. In the third phase, the commission proposes a regulation to the council
based on the recommendation received from STECF and ICES. The last stage
involves the adoption of a regulation by the council and the EU Parliament, setting
TACs for commercially important stocks.69 The M-reg provides the legal framework
for the Regional Advisory Council (RAC) (see the preamble, Paragraphs 6567,
Articles 3(f), 6.2, 12.2, 13.2, 14.1, 18.2, 20.2, 27.2, Part XI, and Annex III, which
address the relationship between the RAC and the commission).70 In its 2008 review
of the functioning of the RAC, the commission disclosed that the criterion used is
‘‘whether that [the RAC’s] advice is compatible with CFP objectives and sustainable
fisheries.’’ The review provides no data on whether the commission may ignore the
RAC’s advice but states its clear relevance.71 Sustainable fisheries are dependent in
part on access to maritime space and to healthy marine ecosystems.
The German position on the achievements under the 2002 M-reg is summarized
accordingly:
Although the introduction of the ecosystem approach to fishery management was
specified as a main target in the reformed CFP in 2002 (Council regulation No.
2371/2002), the implementation has left much to be desired.72
What are the expectations regarding improved outcomes in the new transitional
period (20142022)? Clearly futile implementation will play a role, as will lack of
enforcement.73 Interwoven factors obscure our insight into which factor or factors of
importance cause the CFP objectives to fail.
2.6. The culture of noncompliance by the EU Member States
The 2007 Court of Auditors Report revealed several shortcomings in the EU fishery
control and enforcement system. The main problem is the low compliance with EU
fishery law,74 identified in a 2009 green paper as a lack of compliance by both MS and
the fishing industry, which reveals one of the system’s structural failings.75 The EU
admits that legal compliance needs to improve, also from an economic perspective.
A calculation on economic gains by dodging regulations relates to the severity of
sanctions in cases of detection.76 Sanctions therefore need to countervail the economic
gain of trespassing. Detecting noncompliance with fishery rules, the previous reactions
strengthened enforcement and control measures, as illustrated by the new control
regulation. Because the incentives to cheat on the CFP remain the same, the conflict
between short-term and long-term interests is unchanged. Thus, the CFP is in need
of structural change, both instrumental and normative. Stakeholders will seek
to maximize their gain, often regardless of social and legal rules, the behavior and
opinions of peers, as well as personal moral values.77
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EU law prohibits the EU from enforcing the acquis against fishery industry
addressees, but it is responsible for ensuring MS compliance. The commission’s
proposed ‘‘compliance work plan’’ to ‘‘achieve a more effective, uniform and equitable
application of the rules of the CFP by all the Member States’’78 failed due to weak
implementation, which led to a lack of uniformity and ‘‘the absence of a level playing
field of control and enforcement at EU level.’’79 This concept of equal treatment is
vital, as discrimination based on nationality is prohibited according to EU fisheries
law. The lack of a level playing field encourages unfair competition and illegal fishing.
Transparency promotes liability, a joint belief in fair competition and the absence
of transgression. The compliance work plan drew up a ‘‘scoreboard’’ that aimed
to improve the transparency of the CFP compliance.80 Now discontinued, the
compliance scoreboard contained information on MS’ CFP implementation, i.e. the
conservation of fishery resources, fleet management, structural policy, and control
and enforcement.81
The EU may opt for varied reactions against MS breaching CFP legislation:
Under Article 18.8 and 19.4, the commission may request ‘‘that the MS concerned
amends or repeals the measure.’’
2.7. Conclusion: a ‘‘weakness of will’’
As shown in this section, while the EU fisheries commission has promoted drastic
changes to the regulatory system, the dominant fisheries interests, lobbying the EU
Parliament,82 have been much harder to get onboard. The strong interests promoting
the status quo seem impervious to the lofty ideas served by policy ‘‘avant-gardists.’’
Thus, future solutions that ignore the strength of these interest groups will fail.
This fact has already resulted in corrupt political implementation and a failure to meet
the textually based correct interpretation. The EU has refrained from taking measures
to prevent the tendencies of the fishing industry to sabotage costly hindrances, which,
in turn, has resulted in maintaining the five structural failings. Due to the lack of
stakeholder decision-making competency, radical changes should not be expected
in the CFP anytime soon.
The major problem is, perhaps, a weakness of will to ensure correct implementa-
tion83 and not CFP provisions as such. Thus, the problem is not a lack of reform,
but the lack of implementation of, compliance with, and enforcement of existing
regulations.
However, this argument is in some respects unconvincing, because in most
instances*including the 2013 regulation*the provisions are hindrances and, if
not lifted, even the strongest noncompliance with the legislature cannot prevail.
One clarification is illustrative. A conversion from top-down micromanagement to
bottom-up stakeholder responsibility would entail radical change, including amend-
ing the EU Constitution, specifically TFEU Article 3(1). No MS that is practicing
noncompliance can convert the top-down decision-making system into a bottom-up
system without a radical change in regime, which would require a unanimous decision
by all 28 MS.
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In another case, noncompliance might relate to catch limits on landings. If
amended this rule would apply to catch limitations measured by the catches, not
by landings. Thus, the discharge rule would be transformed from a permission to a
prohibition rule. Here noncompliance may flourish due to lax enforcement and
impossible supervision.
3. EU 2013 remedies to deal with CFP imperfections
This section investigates whether the M-reg has solved or at least mitigated some
of the CFP’s imperfections. The discussion also compares the final and draft
regulations with the commission’s green paper.
3.1. An overview
As explained in Section 3.2, the sustainable exploitation of fish stocks refers to
the exploitation at an MSY. The objective of sustainable development set out in the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas and in the 2002 World Summit on
Sustainable Development adopted sustainability as a target to be obtained by 2015.84
The M-reg objective of reaching MSY is clearly enshrined,85 because the objective
of sustainable exploitation becomes a legal obligation by 2015,86 according to the
EU obligation signed in Johannesburg (2002). The explanatory memorandum
accompanying the proposal states that this target was established because the impact
assessment carried out on the reform of the CFP demonstrated that by 2015 an
MSY would achieve ‘‘significant economic and social improvements.’’87 An impact
assessment carried out before the reform revealed that repaired fish stocks would
generate an extra t2.7 billion for the EU fishing industry,88 resulting in a better
economic performance and social sustainability. However the 2013 regulation
modified the draft law, claiming that the ‘‘maximum sustainable yield exploitation
rate shall be achieved by 2015 where possible and, on a progressive, incremental basis
at the latest by 2020 for all stocks.’’89
This section gives an account of the new management regulation that entered
into force on 1 January 2014, delayed by one year due to the EU Parliament’s
obstructions.
This section examines the setting of the reform and the proposed changes in
management instruments, followed by a discussion on the integration of eco-friendly
policy.
3.2. The still-immature ‘‘radical change’’ of the CFP: political goals in general
A continuous difficulty is the task of developing and making operational the EU’s
expressed political goals. The desired outcome of this legal study is to identify and
evaluate the existing results-based management systems, with a special emphasis on
the rigidity of the legal frames of the CFP.
The problems of fisheries management are serious in many parts of the world, but
those found in EU fisheries stand out, since they persist despite systematic and long-
term efforts to deal with them. The EU identifies the issues as follows90:
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. How do we define the objectives regarding ecological, economic, and social
sustainability91 in a clear, prioritized manner that gives guidance in the short
term and ensures the long-term viability of fisheries?
. Should the future CFP aim to sustain jobs in the fishing industry or should it
aim to create alternative jobs in coastal communities through EU policies?
. How do we define indicators and targets to implement proper guidance for
decision-making and accountability?92 How do we identify time frames for
reaching these targets?
The road ahead prior to the 2013 M-reg included the introduction of a market-based,
transferable fishing concessions (TFC) or quota (ITQ) regime; catch quotas instead of
landing quotas; and an obligation for fishermen to accept camera surveillance of
catches at sea. Hence, the new system ripped up the nation-based, nonharmonized
fisheries system to promote a community-based TFC (ITQ) and catch quota
management system. According to the 2013 regulation, the goal of sustainability
is the basis of this system.93 This has been a long-term objective: ‘‘There is . . . no
conflict between ecological, economic and social objectives in the long term . . .
Ecological sustainability is therefore a basic premise for the economic and social future
of European fisheries.’’94 Thus, in terms of the language, the basic objectives have not
changed much. However, the balance of interests seems*in the commission*to give
priority to the sustainability of fish stocks.
I am committed to setting quotas in accordance with Maximum Sustainable Yield
(fMSY) but, in line with the agreement I brokered on the new CFP, we must phase
it in where it’s immediate application would seriously jeopardize the social and
economic fabric of the fishing fleets impacted. The Commission proposals assume
its immediate application irrespective of the socio economic implications. This is
not acceptable.95
Objectives should become operative specifically by establishing ‘‘indicators and
yardsticks that could provide more concrete guidance or to help measure policy
achievements.’’96 Concrete is defined as follows:
. The fishing industry is essential to supplying food to European citizens and
supporting livelihoods in European coastal areas.97 Ensuring its future is, and
must remain, an important policy objective for the European Union: ‘‘The
CFP shall, in particular: provide conditions for economically viable and
competitive fishing capture and processing industry and land-based fishing
related activity.’’98
. Bringing and keeping the capacity of the fishing fleets in line with fishing
opportunities will inevitably lead to less overall employment in the catching
sector. There is a legitimate social objective in trying to protect the most fragile
coastal communities from this trend. The EU must address the social concerns
in a way that does not prevent larger fleets from undergoing the necessary
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adaptations: ‘‘provide for measures to adjust the fishing capacity of the fleets to
levels of fishing opportunities . . . with a view to having economically viable fleets
without overexploiting marine biological resources.’’99
. One way is differentiated management regimes: one for large-scale fleets,
targeting capacity adjustment and economic efficiency, and another for small-
scale fleets, focusing on social objectives. This division is still within the
jurisdiction of the CFP: ‘‘Existing rules restricting access to resources within the
12 nautical mile zones of MS have operated satisfactorily . . . Those rules have
also preserved the traditional fishing activities on which the social and economic
development of certain coastal communities is highly dependent. Those rules
should therefore continue to apply. MS should endeavour to give preferential
access for small-scale, artisanal or coastal fishermen.’’100
. While the original objective was to split the large-scale segment from the small-
scale one, providing the first fleet with market-based allocation mechanisms and
the latter with direct allocation of quotas, the 2013 regulation rejected this
distinction.101 Now it is up to each MS to make the appropriate choices, save
that the ‘‘measures to adapt the fishing capacity of fishing vessels [relate] to
available fishing opportunities.’’102
. All MS at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development accepted the
2015 deadline for the introduction of the MSY objective.103 Now the goal is
more modest: The EU should establish multiannual plans ‘‘based on scientific,
technical and economic advice, and shall contain conservation measures to
restore and maintain fish stocks above levels capable of producing maximum
sustainable yield in accordance with Article 2(2).’’104 Moreover, the time frame
is now ‘‘within a reasonable time-frame’’ defined as ‘‘no later than 2020.’’105
The difficulty of making a coherent means-end model spills over to the complicated
EU organizational model. The organizational systems that dictate the decision-
making processes produce considerable pain: with 28 MS with diverse and com-
plicated legislative procedures, the need for reform seems ripe. In this paper the focus
is limited to the fisheries acquis only. I address procedures to prescribe new fisheries
legislation in a subsidiary section, that is, I do not address amendments to EU treaties.
The EU directs a varied system of decision-making processes. The EU commission
mainly handles the administrative provisions of these processes, which are steadily
increasing. The commission’s draft law results from a joint expert-bureaucrat
proposal, some of which are protected from political horse-trading. While criticism
has been raised about a democratic deficit in the decision-making processes, this is not
a matter of concern here.
The complexity is comprehensive not only in areas of split competency between
the EU and its MS (TFEU Article 4), but also in areas where the EU has sole
competency (TFEU Article 3).
The organizational system that entitles the EU Council and EU Parliament
‘‘co-legislature’’ is found in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) Articles 14 and 16
and the TFEU. Some would say that these processes are too complicated and
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incoherent to be efficient. Fisheries face exceptions related to ‘‘measures on fixing
prices, levies, aid and quantitative limitations on the fixing and allocation of fishing
opportunities’’ (TFEU Article 43, 3).
The increased complexity results in prolonged proceedings, the time of which has
increased extensively if we compare the two periods 19992004 and 20042009,
with an average duration of 15.2 months for the first reading, 31.3 months for the
second reading, and 43.7 months for the conciliation.106 This time frame contributes
to the inability to make radical amendments. Things remain the way they are, simply
because of the enormous transitional costs and burdens.
3.3. Main changes I: ban on discarding
The commission’s 2009 green paper states, ‘‘[T]he future CFP should ensure that
discarding no longer takes place.’’107 The draft CFP legislation codifies the
obligation to land all catches (Article 15), which is formulated as follows: fish shall
‘‘be brought and retained on board the fishing vessels and recorded and landed,
except when used as live bait . . .’’ The obligation applies to species mentioned in
draft law Article 15 (1) only. It does not apply to the discarding of the by-catches of
noncommercial fisheries. These changes are supposed to take place within specific
time frames, which apply to different species.108 The obligation to land all catches is
not supposed to lead to economic gain for the fisherman and an incentive to avoid
unwanted catches follows from Paragraph 2. The sale of illegal catches, that is, under
minimum size, shall be restricted to fish meal or pet food purposes.109 MS should
ensure that vessels flying its flag are equipped with apt monitoring systems to
guarantee landing compliance.
The final M-reg, however, loosens this grip. Now the objective is ‘‘to gradually
eliminate discards.’’110 The ‘‘landing obligation should be introduced on a fishery-
by-fishery basis. Fishermen should be allowed to continue discarding species which,
according to the best available scientific advice, have a high survival rate when
released into the sea.’’111 Despite the obligation to establish ‘‘multiannual plans or
the specific discard plans’’ (Article 18), the main impression is that the M-reg has
softened the green paper’s expressions that are more absolute.
3.4. Main changes II: technical measures
The M-reg also covers principles for technical conservation measures.112 These
belong to the EU’s exclusive competence. Establishing regional competence invites
an EUMS shared competence. This would require changes in the basic laws
enshrined in the TEU and TFEU, in particular the subsidiarity principle.
The commission*in its draft law*recommends calling off the present micro-
management system to the benefit of decentralization and MS legislation. The
Article 8 of the draft law contains a list of possible technical measures. In comparison
to Article 4.4 of the now-void Regulation 2371/2002, Article 8 prescribes a more
detailed account of the types of measures allowed. Hence, MS may apply*within a
defined toolbox technical rules necessary to achieve the policy’s conservation
objectives. Here the MS should inform parties on measures undertaken, and the
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commission may carry out an assessment of its effectiveness and compatibility. As
a safety guard, the commission may reject an MS decision in order to meet the
Technical Measure framework.113
However, the detailed list proposed was never implemented, as the 2013 M-reg
limited itself to defining the appropriate direction. The M-reg emphasizes the
importance of technical measures in reaching the objectives of the conservation
policy: ‘‘to minimise the negative impact of fishing activities on marine biodiversity
and marine ecosystems, including measures to avoid and reduce, as far as possible,
unwanted catches.’’114 It prescribes an end-result solution that refrains from
interfering with the instruments used, if these are within the framework of the
treaties.
3.5. Main changes III: effort limitation
The draft M-reg directs overcapacity by requiring MS to adjust national fishing fleets
to its fishing opportunities. The commission considered it necessary to maintain a
fleet policy that prescribes a ceiling for each MS.115
However, these proposals never materialized. According to the M-reg, MS*and
not the EU*shall determine the ceiling for both the number of fishing vessels and
the compulsory maximum fleet capacity (preamble, Paragraphs 43 and 44).
The establishment of entryexit schemes (Article 23) prescribes that the total
tonnage should remain at the same level throughout this intermediate period (until
31 December 2022; see Article 49). Simultaneously, the fleet capacity should match
prospective fishing opportunities. Whether MS have sufficiently honored EU
provisions will be evaluated at the end of 2018 (Article 23.3).
3.6. The most radical change: TFC
The draft law introduced a mandatory system of TFC to regulate access to resources.
The EU prolonged the TAC system and the division of MS quotas based on relative
stability. According to the initial schedule, the TFC should be implemented no later
than 31 December 2012 and apply to all vessels 12 meters or more in length, and
all trawlers. The proposed system should apply to all licensed fishing.116 The aim of
this new system is to eliminate overcapacity and to improve the economic result of
the fishing industry as a whole.117
The draft law promotes TFC and introduces a specific safeguard for these vessels.
While the draft law allows MS to exclude small-scale fleets from the TFC system,118
the final legislation left the MS to decide which system to apply,119 at which point
they were required to inform the commission of their decision.120 As this fact reveals,
the commission and its external scientific advisors opted for an ITQ system. Political
pressure would have had it otherwise.
During the debate, several MS disagreed that the TFC is an appropriate system for
the future structure of the CFP or for fishing societies. Of the MS, the French and
German fisheries ministers stated that marine resources are a common good and that
they are opposed to any privatization of the resources. They also claim that the
proposed safeguards are not adequate to ensure the livelihood of coastal communities.
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The Scandinavian MS are more in favor of the system.121 The purpose of this section is
to present some of the main pros and cons.
One main argument for TFC*which each MS should reflect*is the con-
tribution to a better economic performance for the EU’s fishing industry. In Maria
Damanaki’s presentation on the reform of the CFP, she stated that within the
European fishing industry 35% of businesses are operating at a loss and that 11% of
the segments have a negative cash flow, resulting in a negative impact on coastal
regions and fishing communities.122 The commission envisions that TFC might
accelerate fleet capacity reductions, thus justifying the exemption of vessels operating
under the TFC system from the fishing capacity ceiling imposed by the commission
(draft law, Article 35.2).
The council’s draft law states that the new fishing concessions system would
supposedly lead to better economic performance if it were both transferable and
leasable. In practice, if passed, it would mean that a fisherman may acquire a quota
that suits his fishing patterns either by leasing or procuring the quota needed, that is
from their producer organizations.123 This system would decentralize the manage-
ment of fishing opportunities towards the fishing industry.
The flexibility of TFC is supposed to create an incentive for operators to increase
their fishing concessions, while others may decide to leave the industry.124 Because
of this, the EU has predicted that an improved system would raise income figures
by 20% and crew wages by 50100%, by the year 2022.125 The system of TFC,
if introduced, is further expected to contribute to the objectives of environmental,
social, and economic sustainability within the EU.
The pre-decision debate uncovered considerable disagreement. As reported by
ClientEarth, the system of ITQ is supposedly unlawful, according to TFEU Article
345 as well as the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.126 The position was
that the EU lacked competency to interfere with MS property rights, touching upon
the sensitive subject of state sovereignty. In addition, the aim of the principle of
subsidiarity is that the EU may only legislate when it is entitled to do so. Without
going into further detail here, this position is no longer relevant, because the
European Court of Justice interpretation states that TFEU Article 345 is lex inferior
to ‘‘the four freedoms’’ of the EU market.127
Among EU vessels, 77% belong to small-scale fleets.128 Small-scale fleets play
an important role within the EU fishing industry and are equally important for the
EU’s fishing communities and the cultural identity of many coastal regions. ITQ
distribution of fishing rights might ruin rural societies and fishing villages.
MS legislative competence on small-scale fisheries participation may safeguard the
livelihood of fishing communities. MS were supposed to limit transferability to
ensure a close link between coastal communities and the fishing concessions and
perhaps to prevent the excessive concentration of concessions. Furthermore, MS*as
stipulated by the draft law*could impose fees for the use of individual fishing
opportunities to finance management costs.129
While these positions and arguments are still valid on the MS level, the EU is*at
least for now*prohibited from introducing TFCs. Due to objections from the EU
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Parliament, the draft codification failed and the proposal’s most fundamental change
(the establishment of EU mandatory TFCs, which would have required an EU-
harmonized, closed entry system) went ‘‘down the drain.’’ The ultimate solution was
that MS might unilaterally decide to conform to the TFC of their own free will
(preamble, Paragraph 42).
4. Future management regulations: looking into the crystal ball
The problems engulfing EU fisheries management is complex. The purpose of this
comparative analysis of present and past management regulations, draft provisions,
and green papers is to reveal whether the present 2013 M-reg form the necessary
basis for the radical change needed to bring a dysfunctional CFP on track. Is there
any light at the end of the tunnel?
The main conclusion is that the 2013 M-reg has failed to introduce fundamental
new solutions. Thus, if improvement in fisheries stocks is to occur one cannot rely on
new regulations by EU politicians to provide positive results.
Seen in retrospect, the ‘‘clairvoyance’’ of the mid-1970s seems almost prophetic: Yes
indeed, the EU has been plagued with CFP problems ‘‘for some time to come.’’130 A
permanent solution for the CFP is still not in place. Well into the fourth decade since
the first intermediate solutions of the 1970s, we have still not reached a basic and final
fisheries management structure. The 2013 M-reg extends the main elements of the
2002 regulation, which again is mainly a copy of the 1980s provisions. As stated, the
main goal is to ‘‘contribute to the Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and
inclusive growth, and should help to achieve the objectives set out therein’’ (M-reg
preamble, Paragraph 4)*that is ‘‘a multiannual approach’’ (preamble, Paragraph
23), MSY (preamble, Paragraph 32), a multi-stock management plan (preamble,
Paragraph 24), a gradual elimination of discards (preamble, Paragraph 26), and
sustainable partnership agreements with third countries (preamble, Paragraph 51).
On the one hand, there does seem to be some improvement in fishing stocks.
However, one cannot attribute these changes to changes in politics or law. Since the
amendments to repair failings according to the crisis-description of 2009 took place
late 2013, time is too short to conclude whether these most recent amendments will
improve the stock situation.
How to transform ideas for viable fisheries management into reality is still a puzzle.
In principle there are three options: a top-down approach, a bottom-up solution, or a
system of market distribution. As envisaged, no radical changes have taken place.
Hence, the micromanagement system is still in force.
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